Funded by the Humboldt Research Fellowship and the FWO Junior Postdoctoral Fellowship
Consider a kettle heating on a burner stove: why is it that a specific amount of water, interacting with a specific amount of fire, always brings about a specific amount of air? Some metaphysicians believe that natural processes could not take place other than they actually do — call this view natural necessity. Plato is one of them. For him, the regular behaviour of physical entities is the expression of an underlying metaphysical arrangement. But what is this arrangement? Plato’s metaphysics has been extensively investigated, yet a systematic study of how he accounts for natural necessity is still wanting. This is what my project aims to provide. I propose that Plato grounds the necessity of natural phenomena in the elements’ causal powers, whose identity and mutual quantitative relations are determined by the Forms and the demiurge, respectively. My work will shed new light on Plato’s principal metaphysical contributions, affording us a fuller grasp of his philosophical project in the later dialogues (chiefly, the Timaeus and the Philebus). What is more, I cast the resulting Platonic Model against our best modern accounts of natural necessity. This will drive a reassessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary approaches, paving the way to a promising alternative. In short, my project not only offers a novel understanding of key themes in Platonic philosophy but also highlights its potential to inform modern theories of necessity in nature.
Funded by the DAAD Postdoctoral Research Grant
This project investigates how Plato thinks about entities that are constituted by the relations they bear to other entities. In the Sophist, Plato discusses entities such as not-beautiful, not-large, etc. Scholars generally regard not-x as merely the set of all kinds except x. Instead, I argue that negative kinds are something over and above positive ones, and propose to conceptualise them as local networks of relations, whose identity is given by the unique position each occupies within the overall network of relations that holds among all kinds. This same idea can help make sense of a puzzle that Plato raises in the Timaeus: how can “the four kinds” (i.e., the elements) have a determinate identity, given that each is characterised in terms of how it interacts with the others? Against the traditional view, I propose that Plato solves this not by supposing that the elements are constituted by non-relational (geometrical) properties, but by grounding their identities in the overall network of their causal relations. In sum, my project offers a new way of understanding key aspects of Plato’s later dialogues and shows how his proposal can inform our contemporary approach to relational properties.
PhD Thesis at University College London
My thesis develops a novel, systematic account of the metaphysics of sensible entities of Plato’s Timaeus, and is structured in two parts. Part I studies the sensibles’ ontological status — what sort of entities are they? I argue that Timaeus conceives of sensible entities as either consisting in, or being token-identical to, non-repeatable property-instances, each existing at a single place and time. Against what most interpreters hold, on my reading, the Receptacle is to be understood in functionalist terms: it is not a constituent of sensibles, but that in virtue of which the property-instances, as abstract images of the Forms, come to be, as sensible. My proposal is informed by a novel interpretation of Timaeus’ puzzle about the elements (49b2–50a4), the analogies he uses to characterise the Receptacle (50a5–51b1), and his final, ontological summary (52a1–d1). Part II examines the sensibles’ qualitative profile — what sort of properties do they involve? Against the orthodox view, I argue that their constitutive make-up consists solely in the elements’ causal-perceptual properties, which are constituted by the Forms of the elements. In turn, that all occurrences of the elements in the cosmos involve a specific suite of geometrical properties is the work of the demiurge. Accordingly, I contend, the demiurge establishes a set of non-essentialist relations whereby given powers necessarily co-obtain with given geometries, and he does so to enable the elements to exercise their powers in the most suitable manner. My proposal is grounded in a novel interpretation of the pre-cosmic state (52d4–53b5, 69b2–8), the explanatory role of the geometric theory of the elements (53b7–57d7), and the elemental varieties (58c5–68d8). Overall, my thesis provides a comprehensive re-thinking of the Timaean metaphysics, shedding new light on some of Plato’s chief innovations — the Receptacle, the Forms, and the demiurge.
This article revisits the old chestnut Plato, Timaeus 52c2–5, by focussing on its inferential structure. It argues that the passage sets out two chained conditionals (if x, then y; and if y, then z), and examines the implications of this interpretation, both grammatical (the meaning of αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ᾽ ᾧ γέγονεν) and philosophical (the relationship between images and places).
We are all familiar with flames, but what are they, really? Plato’s account of the ontology of sensibles in the Timaeus is notoriously controversial. The “traditional” interpretation holds that sensible entities are particulars, across the dialogue. By contrast, “reconstructionists” maintain that the ‘new beginning’ (48e2) heralds an argument whereby sensibles are proposed to be repeatable characteristics. My paper offers a novel case for traditionalism. Specifically, I argue that, at 48e2ff., we find an account of sensible particulars as consisting of co-located, non-repeatable, non-persistent property-instances, each existing at exclusively one region of the Receptacle at one time. The form of traditionalism I advocate fits better with the text than the rival versions of the view and avoids the objections raised by reconstructionists.
One of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical properties (Seager, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experience of causation (2014, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the dispositionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out to coincide (2018: 1438)), and thus contend that Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Russellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.
In my paper, I shall provide a reading of Diogenes of Apollonia such that his understanding of the metaphysics of differentiation and of individual ensoulment may constitute an ingenious answer to the problems of his time. To this extent, I will argue that Diogenes' worldview solves the difficulties of Anaxagoras' metaphysics and successfully integrates mentality in a causally closed conception of nature. Finally, I will suggest that a Diogenes-inspired approach might be relevant to treat some pressing concerns in the contemporary philosophy of mind – thus demonstrating how his production might offer some interesting solutions for the problems of our time too.
Under Review • A paper on the structure of eidôlopoiia in Plato’s Timaeus.
Under Review • A paper on Critias’ definition(s) of sôphrosunê in Plato’s Charmides.
In Preparation • A paper on negative kinds in Plato’s Sophist.
In Preparation • A paper on the fourfold metaphysical distinction in Plato’s Philebus.
2026 • 'The Mirror, The Liver, The Receptacle. A Study of Eidôlopoiia in Plato’s Timaeus’, The 5th Besançon-Bochum Ancient Philosophy Kolloquium, RUB.
2026 • ‘Temperate Learners in Plato’s Charmides’, Ancient Philosophy Kolloquium, RUB.
2025 • ‘On the Consistency of Geometric Atomism. Geometry, Physics, and Teleology in Plato’s Timaeus’, Ancient Philosophy Kolloquium, RUB.
2025 • ‘Identity-Fixing in Plato’s Timaeus’, The 4th Besançon-Bochum Ancient Philosophy Kolloquium, Université de Franche-Comté (FR).
2025 • ‘Identity-Fixing in Plato’s Timaeus’, Work-in-Progress Seminar Series 2024-2025, University of Turin (IT).
2024 • ‘The Interpretation Interpretation: Plato, Charmides 162d7–165b5’ (with Prof. Tad Brennan, Cornell), Yale Summer Workshop, Yale.
2023 • ‘The Philosophical Import of Geometric Atomism’, Timaeus-nerd Workshop, Yale.
2023 • Response to Alesia Preite (Oxford) ‘How Do the Mortal Parts of the Soul Develop?’, Keeling Graduate & Early Career Conference in Ancient Philosophy, University College London.
2022 • ‘Zeno of Elea and the Post-Parmenidean Pluralists’ at University College London, invited lecture as part of the ‘Ancient Greek Philosophy’ module (PHIL0001; Dr Simona Aimar).
2021 • ‘The Quest for Fundamentality’, 7th Ancient Philosophy Triangle Graduate Colloquium (Oxford– Cambridge–London), Comments by A. Romanowski (Cambridge), Oxford University (UK).
2020 • Response to Chiara Martini (Oxford) ‘Aristotle on Geometrical Objects’, 6th Ancient Philosophy Triangle Graduate Colloquium (Oxford–Cambridge–London), Cambridge University (UK).
2026 • ‘Identity-Fixing in Plato’s Timaeus’, 2026 Henle Conference, Saint Louis University (US).
2025 • ‘Identity-Fixing in Plato’s Timaeus’, LOxY (London-Oxford-Yale) Ancient Philosophy Conference, Yale.
2023 • ‘What Is a Cloud? Timaeus 48e2-53a7’, 4th Annual Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (US).
2022 • ‘The Quest for Fundamentality’, 7th International Association for Presocratic Studies Biennial Conference (IAPS7), European Cultural Centre of Delphi (GR) [selected for plenary session].
2022 • ‘A Case for ‘Middle Platonism’ from the Reception of Plato’s Timaeus’, 2022 British Society for the History of Philosophy Annual Conference, University of Edinburgh (UK).
2021 • ‘Against Russellian Physicalism’, Open Minds XV, University of Manchester (UK).
2021 • ‘Against Russellian Physicalism’, The Mark of the Mental Workshop, IUSS Pavia.
2021 • ‘Against Russellian Physicalism’, 14th Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy Conference, Noto (IT).
2019 • ‘Panpsychism and the Identity View’, London-Warwick Mind Forum, London School of Economics (UK).
2019 • ‘Was Diogenes of Apollonia a Panpsychist?’ 13th Brown University Mark Shapiro Annual Philosophy Conference, Brown University.
2019 • ‘From Plato’s World-Soul to the Panpsychist Worldview. A Panpsychist Reading of Plato’s Philebus’, 93rd Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, Durham University.
2019 • ‘Towards a Panpsychist Reading of Plato’s Later Works’, Royal Institute of Philosophy – Mind, Metaphysics and Language Postgraduate Conference, Durham University.
2018 • ‘All the Possibilities Left Unexploited’, Lake Geneva Graduate Conference, Neuchâtel University (CH).
2018 • ‘The Peculiarity of Angst’, 5th Annual EPSSE Conference, Tallinn University (EE).
2017 • ‘Ecological, Abductive, Heuristic’, Mind and Brain Annual Conference, University of Michigan, Flint (US).
2025 • ‘Plato, Theaetetus 160e5–161e4 — Translation and Comments’, Ancient Philosophy Kolloquium, RUB.
2023 • ‘Plato, Timaeus 51e6-52d1 – Translation and Comments’, A Language for Spatio-temporal Entities in Plato’s Timaeus, RUB.
2023 • ‘Aristotle, De Anima 405a8–406a12 — Translation and Comments’, London Greek Reading Group, UCL.
2022 • ‘Plato, Laws 903b4–905d7 — Translation and Comments’, London Greek Reading Group, UCL.
2022 • ‘Plato, Laws 631d6—635b3 — Translation and Comments’, London Greek Reading Group, UCL.
2021 • ‘Aristotle, Metaphysics 1070b36–1071b2 — Translation and Comments’, London Greek Reading Group, UCL.
2021 • ‘Aristotle, Protrepticus 52.12–58.14 — Translation and Comments’, London Greek Reading Group, UCL.
2020 • ‘Aristotle, Protrepticus 52.6–53.7 — Translation and Comments’, London Greek Reading Group, UCL.